Russia updated its nuclear doctrine

The nuclear power status is of paramount importance for Russia. It helps to ensure strategic deterrence, has great symbolic value, and provides additional options in foreign policy. By employing nuclear messaging, Moscow seeks to influence the decision-making of other states, thus protecting its interests from harmful consequences. For example, in May 2024, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would use non-strategic nuclear weapons exercises to “cool down the hotheads in Western capitals”. This was a reaction to the transfer of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine and the statements by Western officials regarding the support for Kyiv.

Strategic deterrence is one of the key goals of Russia’s security policy, and it involves the threat of both strategic non-nuclear weapons and the existing nuclear arsenal (strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons). The effect is usually created by the rhetoric of officials and institutions, and by various actions related to nuclear or other strategic capabilities, which send Moscow’s desired signals and messages: military exercises, introduction of a higher level of combat readiness in relevant units, deployment of warheads, strikes with strategic non-nuclear weapons, development of nuclear infrastructure, etc. The aim is to strengthen the deterrence and influence the decision-making processes of opponents in favour of Russia. For example, in the context of the war against Ukraine, Russia constantly manipulates its nuclear capabilities. In this way, it seeks to dissuade the West from becoming directly involved in the conflict and from providing military support for Kyiv.

During its war against Ukraine, Russia routinely makes similar statements and uses other means of nuclear messaging. The most important of these in 2024 was the revision of the nuclear doctrine. This document (made public in 2020) sets out the conditions under which Moscow can use nuclear weapons. The Kremlin updated it and made it more relevant to Russia’s current national security situation. Indirect but obvious references to NATO and Ukraine were included, but the most important change was the expansion of the list of conditions allowing the use of nuclear weapons.

Russia’s nuclear doctrine defines the conditions under which
it can use nuclear weapons:

• If it obtained reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking Russia and/or its allies;
• If an adversary used nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the territories of Russia and/or its allies, as well as against Russian military formations and/or facilities located outside of Russia;
• If the actions by an adversary against the Russian state or military installations of critical importance disrupted the response of nuclear forces;
• In case of aggression against Russia or Belarus with the use of conventional weapons, imposing a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;
• If it obtained reliable information on the massive launch of air-space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of Russia.

With these alterations, Russia theoretically expands its abilities to use nuclear weapons, but in practice, it retains the freedom to decide on a response. This is ensured by using vague wording (it is not clear what will be considered a massive air-space attack or a critical threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the state). It is highly likely that the Kremlin is doing this deliberately while seeking to increase strategic uncertainty about its alleged red lines.