Russian intelligence services conduct sabotage activities to undermine Western support for Ukraine
The methods employed by Soviet-era intelligence services, including sabotage and political assassinations, are still in use by their successors, Russian intelligence services. For almost two decades, Russia has been carrying out assassinations against regime critics at home and abroad. However, the sabotage campaign that began in 2023 and escalated in 2024 shows Kremlin’s firm resolve to act not only against its critics but against the entire West. Sabotage activities against Lithuania commenced with the defacement of monuments of historical importance and gradually evolved into more resource-intensive operations in 2024.
We assess the Russian regime highly likely considers relations with the West to be in the grey zone between war and peace. It resorts not only to the usual foreign policy instruments, such as diplomatic pressure, but also employs a range of measures that are not typically associated with peacetime, including violent, covert actions, against states that do not align with Russia’s interests. Russian intelligence services empowered by the country’s political elite carry out sabotage operations similar to those during wartime, with the aim of causing harm to the West without entering into an open conflict. Russia’s sabotage operations transcend national borders: they are systematically and concurrently executed in multiple countries. This sabotage campaign is an integral part of Russia’s aggressive policy towards the West, rather than isolated incidents against individual states.
Russian intelligence services are using a multi-tiered system of intermediaries to conceal the real initiators and coordinators of sabotage operations. Individuals recruited for these actions by Russian intelligence services on social networks, particularly Telegram, fit the profile of people interested in quick and easy financial rewards. These individuals are usually offered simple but well-paid and quick jobs during the recruitment process. As a rule, potential saboteurs are selected based on their ability to move freely around Europe, irrespective of any specific skills or training they may have.
Unlike conventional Russian intelligence agents, recruited saboteurs frequently complete only a limited number of tasks before being detained. Furthermore, they do not receive the promised financial payments or any support from Russia once they are arrested. In 2024, over 50 saboteurs and coordinators were apprehended in Europe, several of them were arrested following investigations by Lithuanian intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
By conducting sabotage operations, Russia almost certainly is trying to influence Western societies, increase distrust in state institutions, and force political leaders to weaken support for Ukraine. We assess the Kremlin is failing to achieve these objectives, particularly in Lithuania. According to public opinion polls, most residents of Lithuania support the state’s commitment to continue supporting Ukraine, and Lithuania remains one of the most active supporters. Annual military assistance to Ukraine remains stable at no less than 0.25 percent of Lithuania’s GDP.
