The Putin regime is confident of victory over Ukraine and the West

Russia’s main objective in its war against Ukraine has not changed since 2014. It seeks to turn Ukraine into a dependent state and to compel Western democracies to acknowledge Russia’s right to interfere in the internal affairs of its sovereign neighbours. Having failed to achieve its objectives through manipulation and influence operations against Ukraine, Russia chose to utilise military force in 2022.

Russia openly declares that peace with Ukraine is only achievable on its own terms, which state that both Ukraine and the West must accept defeat and acknowledge that Russia’s aggression was lawful. A diplomatic solution to the conflict is unlikely, as this would simply see Russia return to the same stalemate that Vladimir Putin decided to reverse in February 2022 by attacking Ukraine. Russia’s military measures are proving effective. This is demonstrated by Russia’s regained confidence in its armed forces, the expansion of Ukrainian territories under occupation, and the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure.

Russia has the resources to continue the war for years. In any democracy, such situation as the one in Russia would be regarded a disaster: massive human losses, problems in the financial system, economic stagnation in sectors unrelated to the military industry, and foreign trade sustainable only because of smuggling and shadow schemes. Nevertheless, the war is popular in Russia. In an authoritarian society, the results of public opinion polls may not be entirely reliable due to the fear of reprisals, but even the responses to a completely non-political question, “How are you feeling today?”, are the most positive since 1994 (historical data show that the economic crises in 1998 and 2008 and the mobilisation in 2022 had a short-term negative impact on public opinion). Both the regime and most of the Russian population believe that the war in Ukraine is not against Ukrainians, but rather against the West. Although almost 60 percent of Russians believe that the war in Ukraine could escalate into a war with NATO, this likely only strengthens support for the war and the regime.

The Putin regime considers itself to be in full control of the political and social situation, and threats to its stability The Putin regime is confident of victory over Ukraine and the West RUSSIA 17 are unlikely in the short term. Putin’s perceived superiority over Ukraine-supporting Western democracies will drive his resolution to wage war and exert pressure on the West until he secures substantial concessions.

A ‘peace for land’ solution to the conflict is also unlikely, as the annexation of Ukrainian territory is not an end goal for Russia, rather an instrument to legitimise and consolidate its aggressive policy. The Kremlin is forcibly Russifying the occupied Ukrainian territories because it has no intention of negotiating their return and highly likely is seeking to turn their inhabitants against a non-occupied Ukraine in the long term. Russification is not a bargaining chip for Moscow; it is an integral part of the destruction of Ukraine.

International pressure has no effect on Russia’s position. Chinese support and sanctions evasion schemes mitigate the impact of international sanctions, while most of the Global South does not support Russia’s policies but has no interest in breaking relations with it. Russia’s attempts to build an anti-Western coalition have so far failed to produce substantial results. However, Russia’s efforts to create alternative frameworks for economic and financial cooperation and to weaken confidence in existing international institutions and legal norms could have significant longterm implications for the evolution of the global order.

Russia’s strengthening alliances with Iran and North Korea indicate a significant shift in Russian foreign policy. In its confrontation with the West, Russia is willing to collaborate with any ally or use any means available at its disposal. Russia views conflicts, such as those in the Middle East as well as supporting and arming authoritarian regimes, as an opportunity to expand its influence and divert the attention of its opponents. Russia has no intention of re-establishing its former relations with democratic countries. Even if the war in Ukraine ended or was frozen, threats emanating from Russia – military aggression, sabotage and influence activities – would persist. Moscow would only reconsider its priority targets. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s demand that the West return to the 1997 NATO borders is indicative of this. The reason behind this ultimatum is to undermine the capacity of Central and Eastern European states to resist Russian influence and military aggression.