## CONTENTS

I. FOREWORD BY DIRECTOR ........................................................................................................... 3

II. REFORM OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ................................................................. 5

III. LITHUANIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ........ 8

IV. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ............................................................... 9

V. PREVENTION OF THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY ..................................................... 11

VI. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ................................................................. 13

VII. VSD PERSONNEL ............................................................................................................... 15

VIII. VSD BUDGET ...................................................................................................................... 18

IX. PUBLIC OPINION ON VSD ACTIVITIES ............................................................................ 20
I. FOREWORD BY DIRECTOR

Having assumed the office of the director of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – VSD), I perceived an intelligence reform as my key mission. The reform has been completed with the entry of the new Law on Intelligence into force in 2013. This was a milestone in the history of VSD as we became a pure security intelligence service.

The third Annual review summarizes the activity of VSD, points out our most important achievements in 2013 and reminds the public of our key guiding principles.

In the second half of 2013 Lithuania held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. VSD intelligence officers were involved in the activities of the EU working groups and implemented a wide range of diplomatic security and counterintelligence measures. VSD officers were very highly evaluated by our partners. Our officers were actively involved in awareness-raising and gave briefings on counterintelligence related threats to Lithuanian officials and civil servants who during the Presidency resided and worked in Brussels.

In recent years Lithuanian energy sector started taking important steps towards self-sufficiency. Significant efforts of Lithuania to increase both its national and European energy security primarily trying to break the monopoly of the single gas supplier entailed clashes of different national interests. As energy and political solidarity merge together, the common EU energy policy, once in place, could contribute to the security of our societies. VSD follows those developments in this critical sector, which might bear economic and political implications and provides intelligence assessments to the decision makers.

Information space remained a battleground of hostile interests. The soft power is often used to shape a negative public opinion on some promising energy projects and even raise doubts about the prospects of the EU in general. The recent events in the Crimea accompanied by distorted Russian media coverage remind us of the war being fought for a human brain. Separating the wheat from the chaff in the endless flow of information is a demanding task. The efficiency of modern propaganda tools and techniques developed and used by Russia are acknowledged by information warfare experts and researchers. VSD lacks technical capacity to fully ensure secure communications in cyber space. The public has witnessed attempts by hostile actors to compromise Lithuanian officials. Such vulnerabilities are also determined by our geographic location as well as contemporary technologies. Therefore make no mistake – almost every communication in cyber space can be intercepted.

Seeking to increase transparency and public knowledge about our activities VSD published statistics about the array of intelligence collection means authorized by court. Hopefully the numbers provided will diminish groundless reproaches about the mass surveillance that VSD had been wrongfully subjected to in the past. Like many other democratic intelligence and security services VSD has been facing controversial comments about our preventive capabilities and measures. Let me remind you that hostile actors constantly target individuals that possess access to classified information, specific professional skills or knowledge. And I can assure you that VSD officers are fulfilling their duty to inform individuals concerned about potential risks and threats regardless their social status and employment. I believe that providing assistance to own intelligence services is a civic duty.
The intelligence reform has separated intelligence agencies from law enforcement institutions. The separation of threat assessments and pre-trial investigation has added greater clarity in some notorious legal proceedings. In the past VSD was considered to be an unwatched watcher, today VSD is subject to clear intelligence tasks set in accordance with intelligence requirements. VSD activities are framed into intelligence cycle with no room for lawless actions. There is a delicate balance between safeguarding and respecting human rights and freedoms and ensuring the prevention of crimes and threats. The new Law on Intelligence has eliminated legislation flaws that allowed for misleading interpretations of VSD role in crime prevention.

The current legal framework provides VSD with sufficient tools to prevent threats to national security. However, in democratic countries the public trust in government institutions is indispensible. Public perception of threats is vital and I hope that the obligation of Lithuanian intelligence services to provide annual reviews will effectively contribute to greater public awareness of threats and their prevention.

Since 1990 Lithuanian intelligence services have undergone changes and reforms following new models and coping with emerging challenges. I hope that having developed into a western intelligence service, VSD will forge a strong relationship with the public that shall be based on public trust and responsibility of the intelligence services, patriotism and loyalty to our country.

Gediminas Grina
Director
State Security Department
Republic of Lithuania
II. REFORM OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

On 1 January 2013 the new version of the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania entered into force. This date marks the completion of the first fundamental reform of the national intelligence system.

Separation of intelligence and counterintelligence from criminal investigation

One of the most important accomplishments of the intelligence reform was to separate intelligence and counterintelligence from criminal investigations. The new Law on Intelligence became the cornerstone of the national intelligence system as it has abolished the dual mandate of VSD to perform intelligence and law enforcement function enabling the integration of VSD into the national defense system.

Prevention of crimes and threats separated

Sometimes in the public debates VSD is blamed for inactivity or lack of initiative in neutralizing threats to national security. The new law clearly determines the remit of the intelligence institutions and establishes legal framework for neutralization of threats to national security.

The Law on Intelligence makes clear distinction between a threat and a crime. A threat to national security does not necessarily imply a criminal act. In a democratic society the public perception of threats to national security is crucial to their prevention. An individual may unconsciously engage in activities posing threat to national security, however, he/she is expected to act consciously after the national security institution warns him/her on the nature of his/her activities. The public should be mature and patriotic enough to identify harmful activities. In order to raise public awareness and knowledge about the hostile intelligence activities and methods, Lithuanian intelligence services publish annual reviews and threat assessments as obliged by the Law. This is a possibility for VSD to provide the public an overview of the activities of intelligence services and it serves as a promotion to their democratic oversight.

Elimination of legal flaws

Prior to completion of the intelligence reform, the fine line between law enforcement and intelligence collection has sometimes triggered unmotivated accusations or suspicions regarding the activities of VSD. For instance, the fact that under exceptional circumstances by prosecutor’s order VSD officers had to interact with representatives of hostile foreign security services, had a negative impact to public opinion on VSD.

The new Law on Intelligence has eliminated legal ambiguities in cases when collection of intelligence was directed by the Prosecutor General's Office, in accordance with the Criminal Code (hereinafter - CC). Prior to 2013, VSD had been entitled to collect intelligence only if the elements of the criminal act had been identified, that did not necessarily coincide with intelligence priorities or national security interests. According to the new Law on Intelligence, the supervision of VSD clandestine activities was transferred to the courts, which ensure that VSD activities related to the restrictions of the right to privacy would be proportional to the threat and information collected. The law clearly defines principles for intelligence collection as well as its limits and procedures.
Consolidation of democratic principles governing activities of the intelligence institutions and their oversight

The new Law on Intelligence consolidated the national intelligence system aligning our work with the democratic principles of intelligence services, i.e. respect for human rights and freedoms, political neutrality, the separation of intelligence collection from law enforcement, and identification of VSD as a national security institution.

Authorization of intelligence collection means

There were public comments that the new Law on Intelligence fails to ensure efficient oversight of VSD activities, as those are no longer supervised by prosecutors.

However, prosecutor’s role in authorization intelligence collection activities and intelligence collection means previously had no legal provisions. The new Law on Intelligence defines the intelligence collection means and distinguishes the ones that are subject to authorization by court. Moreover, intelligence is collected with regard to the threats to national security, while distancing from law enforcement activities, except for the very specific cases.

In accordance with the Law on Intelligence, Lithuanian intelligence services will conduct criminal intelligence investigations under specific articles of the Criminal Code while supervised by the Prosecutor.

VSD will conduct a criminal intelligence investigation in case of:
- organization of or complicity in the coup (Art. 114 of CC);
- assisting another State to act against the Republic of Lithuania - its constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defense or economic power (Art. 118 of CC);
- espionage (Art. 119 of CC);
- creation of or participation in the activities of anti-constitutional groups or organizations, which seek to illegally alter the constitutional order of Lithuanian State, commit an attempt on its independence or territorial integrity (Art. 121 of CC);
- public incitement to violently transgress the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania – to alter its constitutional order, overthrow the legitimate Government, commit an attempt on its independence or territorial integrity (Art. 122 of CC);
- disclosure, loss or unauthorized disposition of information constituting a state secret (Art. 124, 125 and 126 of CC);
- disclosure, theft or other unauthorized acquisition of information constituting an official secret (Art. 296 and 297 of CC).

Retention of remit and functions of VSD

The adoption of the new Law on Intelligence gave rise to various comments about the alleged disability of VSD to perform its functions. Contrarily, the establishment of legal basis for intelligence and counterintelligence activities has allowed for an increased accountability of the intelligence institutions both to oversight authorities and to the public. VSD did not renounce or surrender any functions to other institutions. The scope of VSD activities remains unchanged, but their form and procedures are different.
Retention of VSD functions in fight against terrorism. Issue of inter-institutional coordination pending

In 2011 after the Seimas had decided to withdraw the right of VSD to conduct pre-trial investigations, only one terrorism-related case was transferred to the police. According to the Law on the Basics of National Security, VSD serves as a national coordinator in fight against terrorism, which is incompatible with democratic principles governing the activities of intelligence institution. Consequently, VSD has proposed to renounce the coordination role, without prejudice to its currently performed terrorism prevention function.

Subordination of the Centre of Governmental Communications

In the result of national intelligence reform the Centre of Governmental Communications has been subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. The main purpose of this change was to consolidate the management and protection of national electronic communication networks and information systems, and reduce security risks to classified information. VSD will continue carrying out intelligence and counterintelligence tasks protecting national electronic communication networks as well as their cryptographic and other security.
III. LITHUANIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In 2013 VSD actively contributed to the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union by participating in working groups, as well as implementing diplomatic security and counterintelligence measures.

VSD presided over the EU Council terrorism working group (TWG) and the European intelligence services’ fight against terrorism group (CTG). VSD representatives along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped to facilitate the Presidency of the EU Council terrorism (external aspects) working group (COTER). VSD representatives also participated in the activities of the EU Council A.13 Working Group, they organized and hosted the meetings and events to ensure the safety during the Presidency in Lithuania and abroad.

Throughout the Presidency VSD conducted diplomatic security and counterintelligence measures that were prompted by an increased attention from hostile foreign intelligence and security services towards Lithuania during the EU Presidency. Counterintelligence information about potential threats was continuously shared with the intelligence and security services of the EU and NATO Member States as well as EU institutions.

VSD presidency of the EU Council terrorism working group

The most important objective of Lithuanian Presidency of TWG was to prepare for the revision of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment. During the Presidency Lithuania held debates on the most important issues in the field of prevention of radicalization and terrorist recruitment: use of firearms for the terrorism purposes, influence of media and the Internet on the radicalization and recruitment to terrorism, use of terrorist travel information for counter-terrorism purposes. Moreover, Lithuania distributed a questionnaire regarding the issue of combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. On the basis of replies from the EU Member States a summary of the proposals was drawn up and forwarded to the European Commission, which was in the process of preparation to revise the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment.

In the framework of the EU Media Communications Strategy update a discussion was organized in TWG regarding the influence of media and the Internet on radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. Following Lithuanian initiative it was agreed that the strategy should not be updated as a separate document, but integrated into the revised the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment. Such position was based on the replies of the EU Member States to the questionnaire prepared by Lithuania on the application of the EU Media Communications Strategy at the national level.

At the request of one Member State, Lithuania held a TWG discussion about the possibilities of use of the Schengen Information System, in order to track the movement of foreign fighters. It should be noted that after this discussion in TWG, according to data provided by the European Commission, the number of alerts on persons in Schengen Information System (SIS II) issued by the Member States has increased by 56 percent.
IV. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Intelligence collection

VSD intelligence and counterintelligence efforts are focused on national security threats and in accordance with the intelligence requirements (IR) as set by the State Defence Council, which is chaired by the President of the Republic. In 2013 intelligence collection was driven by internal and external policy issues, such as Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and Eastern Partnership Initiative as well as implementation of critical infrastructure projects. In 2013, VSD focused on regional threats in particular related to energy security, foreign influence on the ethnic minorities in Lithuania, left- and right-wing extremism, terrorism and foreign efforts to influence Lithuanian information space.

VSD counterintelligence endeavours were focussed on the hostile activities of Russian and Belarusian intelligence and security services. VSD identified and neutralised hostile intelligence attempts to recruit Lithuanian citizens or by other means obtain sensitive and in some cases classified information. Russian intelligence officers under diplomatic cover of the Russian Embassy, Russian Trade Representation and Consulate General in Klaipėda are particularly aggressive in conducting intelligence operations with the aim to acquire information about Lithuania and its partners.

In 2013, VSD successfully expanded its bilateral and multilateral relations with allied intelligence and security services facilitating the safeguard of national security.

Activities authorized by court

Lithuanian legislation enables VSD officers to collect information by the means which infringe privacy rights. However, in each case these measures are authorized by a reasoned ruling of a regional court. VSD is enabled to carry out the following measures subject to the court authorization:

- monitoring and recording of the content of information transmitted by electronic communications networks, correspondence and other personal communications;
- entering a person’s dwelling, other premises or vehicles, inspection and documenting thereof;
- seizure or covert inspection and registration of documents or items;
- obtaining information on electronic communications and financial operations

The court would evaluate the justification of a VSD request and make decision, leveraging the intelligence information to be collected, potential damage to national security and privacy rights infringement.

In 2013, VSD applied 2201 measures authorized by court which effected 1822 individuals\(^1\), among whom 872 were Lithuanian citizens, 905 – foreign nationals, 38 – legal persons and 7 – unidentified individuals.

VSD puts a lot of efforts in preventing authority abuse by our officers and investigate potential abuse cases as appropriate. In 2013, VSD launched 12 internal investigations on possible misconduct. Consequently four intelligence officers and one employee received disciplinary penalties.

In case of potential human rights violation by VSD officers, individuals are entitled to address the Office of Ombudsmen, however, no complaints were filed in 2013. During the same period VSD

\(^1\) The difference in numbers of persons and activities authorized by court occurred due to the fact that there may have been multiple activities sanctioned against a single individual following different provisions of the Law on Intelligence.
examined statements and applications from 131 citizens and 13 legal persons as well as 112 requests by various institutions mostly pertaining to possible human rights abuse, requests for information about themselves, other individuals and VSD activities.
V. PREVENTION OF THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Dissemination of information to the decision makers

Intelligence collected by VSD is provided to the decision makers and institutions, responsible for the national security. The main customers of VSD intelligence information are:

- The President;
- The Speaker of the Parliament;
- National Security and Defence Committee of the Parliament;
- Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament;
- The Prime Minister;
- Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Transport etc.;
- Other state institutions.

VSD also provides annual threat and risk assessments that support the planning of national policies and serve as an important tool for threat prevention.

VSD conducts surveys of intelligence consumers to encourage the feedback about their needs and the quality of intelligence products. In 2013 VSD sought to receive consumer comments about comprehensiveness, timeliness and relevance of the products in order to improve and adapt them as required.

Cooperation with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies

In cases when information about criminal activities or threats falling outside VSD remit is received, we forward this information to other government institutions. Intelligence information may be passed to the Second Investigation Department (AOTD) under the Ministry of National Defence (Lithuanian military intelligence service). Information about potential criminal offences is passed to law enforcement institutions, such as Special Investigation Service (hereinafter - STT), Financial Crime Investigation Service (hereinafter - FNTT) under the Ministry of the Interior or the Prosecution Service. These institutions are entitled to launch a pre-trial investigation.

Providing findings and consultations

Another important strand of VSD work is to provide findings and consultations to government institutions in order to prevent threats of espionage, extremism, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Based on VSD findings and consultations individuals potentially posing threat to national security may be denied entry to Lithuania, access to classified information or appointment to a public service post.

In 2013, VSD consulted the Department of Migration and provided findings about potential threat to national security posed by foreign nationals applying for residence permits or visas. Based on our recommendations 628 applications (out of total 21.169) were rejected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings and consultations on:</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration applications</td>
<td>20.169</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation of civil servants</td>
<td>2.045</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accreditation of diplomatic personnel and foreign journalists</td>
<td>1.789</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship applications</td>
<td>1.769</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel vetting</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients of State decorations</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.852</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Law on Public Service stipulates that candidates for a position in public service must be of irreproachable reputation. In accordance with the law, VSD provided information to government institutions whether the applicants for a position in the public service as well as the individuals applying for studies in the Police school, the Border guards school or Public Security faculty of Mykolas Romeris University, were members of illegal organizations. In 2013 VSD identified that 2 individuals out of 2045 were members of such organisations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts a vetting of individuals seeking accreditation in Lithuania and VSD, in turn, examines whether accreditation of a particular individual would pose a threat to the national security, or whether the individual seeking accreditation is an undercover officer of a foreign intelligence and security service. In 2013, VSD received 1789 requests for accreditation and provided 3 negative findings.

VSD also performs a background check of the individuals applying for a citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania and provides information to the Citizenship Commission, Department of Migration under the Ministry of the Interior and Migration Divisions of the Territorial Police Offices whether the applicants conspired to commit or committed international crimes or crimes against the Republic of Lithuania.

384 findings concerning the nominees for state decorations were presented to the Office of the President and the Council of the State Awards. In 3 cases VSD provided negative recommendations.

In 2013, within its remit VSD provided information to various government institutions regarding the reliability of individuals seeking or holding office at a state or municipal institution:
- Customs Department under the Ministry of Finance was provided with 236 conclusions, one of them negative;
- VIP Protection Department under the Ministry of the Interior was provided with 81 conclusions, two of them negative;
- Special Investigation Service was provided with 1115 findings, thirteen of them negative.

423 findings (including a negative one) were provided according to the requirements of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania and Law on Insurance. These findings are provided on request by the Insurance Supervisory Commission to prevent the use of funds of criminal origin in the Lithuanian insurance sector.

Apart from the mentioned above, VSD has also provided 1112 findings to other government institutions regarding natural and legal persons potentially posing threat to national security. In these cases no threats were identified.

In general the number of conclusions and consultations provided to government institutions increased during 2013. The number of findings identifying potential threat to national security increased two and a half times compared to 2012.
VI. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

VSD has extensive supervisory responsibilities in the field of protection of classified information. We control the implementation of the policy for the protection of classified information and adherence to the procedures governing the access to classified information. In performing these tasks, VSD conducts security inspections of state institutions, private companies and individuals. VSD also provides security briefings to the holders of personal security clearances and implements counterintelligence measures to prevent disclosure of classified information to foreign intelligence and security services or other unauthorized person or entity.

33 000 individuals hold security clearance to handle classified information, among them – 25 000 are cleared to handle state secrets

The workload of VSD related to protection of classified information is constantly increasing due to the growing number of applications for security clearances. In 2013 VSD vetted 5380 individuals applying for a personal security clearance. In 15 cases VSD recommendations were negative. In 2013 VSD also screened 97 legal persons applying for a facility security clearance. One application was rejected.

VSD enhanced the oversight of protection of classified information in government institutions. In 2013 VSD has inspected 89 entities that are entitled to handle classified information, as well as 51 premises belonging to the entities in order to examine their suitability to handle classified information of the Republic of Lithuania. Equally, VSD supervises the protection of classified information that NATO, EU and foreign countries have released to Lithuania. VSD carried out 8 inspections and checked 13 premises belonging to entities entitled to handle classified information released to Lithuania. Consequently, VSD has made recommendations regarding the storage of classified information that have been taken into account by the state institutions.
In 2013 VSD held awareness training for protection of classified information to the employees of the Seimas, Ministry of Energy as well as judges and prosecutors.
VII. VSD PERSONNEL

VSD employs experts in different areas of expertise – intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance, analysis, management, etc. The majority of VSD personnel are 30 to 39 years of age.

The majority of VSD intelligence officers hold Master’s degree, another 2 percent have completed a Doctoral degree.

The male-female ratio in VSD remains similar over the past years: 68 percent for men and 32 percent for women.
In 2013, the number of VSD employees did not change significantly. However, the number of persons willing to join the Department is consistently growing. In 2013 60 percent of applicants were up to 29 years old. This signifies that younger generation has a greater confidence and motivation to work for VSD.

According to 2011 public opinion survey “Public opinion about law enforcement bodies, courts and public safety awareness in Lithuania” initiated by the Ministry of the Interior\(^2\), 63 percent of respondents consider VSD as a prestigious employer. Research shows that the perception has remained unchanged for the last few years.

In 2013, VSD reviewed its personnel recruitment system in order to attract talented, motivated and loyal individuals. Main focus was given to the development of human resources policy and the strategy of human resources management, with the aim to transform VSD into a modern organization that cares about the adaptation and integration of personnel, professional training, career planning and performance management. While aiming at this, certain changes and improvements in human resource management and administrative procedures have been made and new staff policy tasks have been set. These changes are meant to improve the performance and public image of VSD.

Intelligence experts are not readily available on the labor market. Unlike for law enforcement officers, there are no specialized educational institutions or programs designed for intelligence officers in Lithuania. VSD has an established intelligence officer training system and provides to the newly employed personnel the knowledge of the tradecraft of the intelligence officer. It takes up to 5 years to prepare a qualified and capable intelligence officer. Newly employed intelligence officers acquire special skills gradually as they serve. VSD officers also undergo training required to improve their qualification and skills.

In 2013, VSD continued senior level rotation. This process encourages and helps to acquire new skills and competencies, foster their creativity and innovativeness and accumulate more profound

\(^2\) VSD was considered as a part of public security
knowledge about the activity of VSD in general. By the end of 2013, the majority of heads of directorates underwent rotation and there remain 4 heads who had been holding the office for more than five years.
VIII. VSD BUDGET

2013 VSD budget remained at the level of 2005 and was slightly lower than in 2012. Most of the funding was allocated to personnel and operating costs.

If compared to other authorities responsible for national security, the VSD budget in 2013 was a little larger than, for example, the budget of the Public Security Service under Ministry of the Interior, but smaller than the budget of the State Border Guard Service under the Ministry of the Interior and those of other institutions.


In 2013, only minimal design and construction works of the new VSD Headquarters were carried out. By the end of 2013, LTL 123.8 million in total were spent on the construction of the new VSD headquarters. In the period 2014–2017 the investment of about LTL 60.2 million would enable us to complete the construction and issue the certificate of occupancy. The new VSD headquarters will meet the NATO security requirements and will satisfy the intelligence service needs. It will help to reduce high rental costs.
In 2013 VSD investments amounted approximately to LTL 3.5 million.

IX. PUBLIC OPINION ON VSD ACTIVITIES

Contrary to the activities of the Police, Fire Rescue Service or Courts, VSD visibility on the public is rather low. Public opinion on VSD activities is shaped by media reports and controversial comments by politicians. As a rule, VSD refrains from making comments on different views and opinions and very often cannot comment on the facts due to the security classification. However, the public attention should be drawn to distorted facts or intentional bias. The National Security and Defense Committee of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, that is directly responsible for parliamentary oversight over VSD, could play an important role in this area.

The work of VSD is meant to be discreet but effective. Unlike most other government institutions, VSD does not strive for visibility and does not allocate any funds for on demand publications.

Nevertheless, public opinion on VSD activities is positive. Opinion polls of July 2013 show that 48 percent of the respondents have confidence in VSD activities and exceeds the part of the public that tend to distrust VSD.

Public trust is vital for smooth functioning of VSD. In February 2014 the public opinion poll revealed that young people (up to 29 years) put high confidence in VSD (47 percent). However, the public has little understanding of VSD activities – quite a number of people (37 percent) relate VSD with prevention and investigation of financial crimes and corruption that fall into the remit of Special Investigation Service. 58 percent realize that VSD role is to ensure national security. The survey also showed that the public has a vague knowledge about VSD mandate to operate inside the country and abroad.

According to the same survey, 56 percent of respondents believe that VSD activities are too clandestine. This annual review is an attempt to change that perception and goes for greater clarity on VSD activities. VSD will continue to inform the citizens about emerging threats and increase their awareness and interest in security developments as this contributes to the strengthening of national security and efficient functioning of VSD.