Entities working against Lithuania’s national security interests continue to target strategically important infrastructure and projects, but their methods of operation are changing
Entities with links to Russia, Belarus or China that pose a threat to our national security pursue their interests in strategically important sectors or projects in Lithuania and other Baltic States. Their efforts are not deterred even when their plans are revealed and prevented from proceeding during the investment screening process.
The Lithuanian financial sector, particularly the cryptocurrency segment, remains an attractive target for such entities. Russian citizens seeking to engage in the cryptocurrency sector attempt to conceal their affiliations with Russia, often by using citizenships of a NATO or EU member state.
Companies with links to Russia and Belarus, as well as individual citizens of these countries, have so far been interested in Lithuania’s transport and energy sectors. They are also showing an increasing interest in the high-tech sector. They are constantly changing their tactics and looking for new opportunities to gain access to sectors or infrastructure of strategic importance. One method of achieving this is to establish business contacts with entrepreneurs from other European countries or the US, convincing them that the cooperation will yield significant returns, while avoiding direct participation in the initiative. These entities require reliable entrepreneurs from other countries to conceal their involvement and create a positive image. When their plans fail in Lithuania, they try to implement them in other Baltic States.
Russian entities remain interested in disrupting strategically important projects in Lithuania and other Baltic States. Recently, Russian institutions have been paying a close attention to transport projects implemented by the Baltic States. It is highly likely that these institutions are interested in disrupting the projects in order to limit military mobility in the Baltic States.
Russian intelligence services likely will attempt to collect information about the infrastructure of the Port of Klaipėda and the strategically important cargo handled there by exploiting foreign-registered ship crew members. According to the intelligence, pro-Russian individuals belonging to crews of ships visiting the port have on several occasions photographed the port infrastructure and sensitive cargo. Russian intelligence services possibly would be willing to use the obtained information to plan sabotage or other kinetic operations.
Although the Baltic States have implemented projects aimed at securing their energy independence, Russian entities remain active in pursuing influence within the regional energy sector. They are developing new strategies to resume supplying the Baltic States with Russian energy resources and are looking for individuals who can help them to achieve these goals. While these strategies are unlikely to succeed, the active pursue of these interests likely will continue in the near term.