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REPORT ABOUT THREATS

If you know of information that you think is related to national security threats – that there is a threat or there may be a threat – immediately inform the State Security Department (VSD) about it.

menu menu Contents
ENTRY
INTRODUCTION
FOREWORD
SUMMARY
RUSSIA
Reduced Western pressure on Moscow would accelerate Russia’s preparations for conflict with NATO
Russia is expanding its military capabilities near NATO’s eastern borders despite losses in the war
Russia actively uses electronic warfare capabilities in Kaliningrad
Russian military industry prepares for a new phase of expansion
Russia increases pressure on Ukraine’s supporters
The GRU is changing the methods of conducting kinetic operations and expanding the range of targets
The FSB is actively conducting intelligence activities against Lithuania by regularly recruiting individuals who travel from Lithuania to Russia
Intensified Russia’s UAV attacks against Ukraine have led to an increase in violations of Lithuanian airspace
It is highly likely that the situation in the Baltic Sea will remain tense – Russia is determined to protect its commercial interests by any means necessary
Russia rather adapts to an economic slowdown than changes its military ambitions
During the strategic exercise Zapad 2025 Russia applied lessons learned in Ukraine
Moscow tries to intimidate the West by creating the myth of the invincible Oreshnik missile
Despite the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Russia will maintain its military capabilities in Syria
Russia expands its activities in Africa to maintain its image as a global power
BELARUS
Lukashenka is easing international isolation of the Belarusian regime but does not abandon authoritarian practices or the country’s orientation towards Russia
Relations with China help Belarus to reduce the impact of international isolation
Belarus’s use of extremist watchlists and remote recruitment of agents in its fight against the democratic opposition poses a threat to Lithuania
CHINA
China seeks to reshape the international order by forming a bloc of anti-Western states
The use of Chinese artificial intelligence chatbots presents challenges in terms of personal data security and information censorship
China is consistently increasing its military power in order to ensure its security interests and expand its influence
Intensifying military cooperation between Russia and China signals a strengthening strategic partnership
ECONOMIC AND ENERGY SECURITY
Belarus is committed to the development of nuclear energy in the vicinity of the Lithuanian border
Entities working against Lithuania’s national security interests continue to target strategically important infrastructure and projects, but their methods of operation are changing
Although the scale of international sanctions circumvention remains high, the operating models have not changed
Russian and Belarusian entities seek to operate in the technology sector and use companies established in Lithuania to develop and acquire technologies
Western science and research institutions are in the crosshairs of hostile states
CYBER SECURITY
Cyberattacks are increasing in scale and becoming more destructive
INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST LITHUANIA
Pro-Russian individuals contribute to the implementation of hostile states’ goals in Lithuania
Russia is stepping up its information campaigns on social networks, using constant propaganda narratives to support them
Despite declaring a strive for greater independence, the Orthodox Diocese of Vilnius and Lithuania remains dependent on the Moscow Patriarchate
EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
The rise in popularity of nihilistic right-wing extremism among psychologically vulnerable minors is increasing the likelihood of ‘lone wolf’ attacks
Islamist terrorist organisations and their followers are targeting minors
The threat of terrorism in Europe will remain high
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The FSB is actively conducting intelligence activities against Lithuania by regularly recruiting individuals who travel from Lithuania to Russia

The FSB is actively conducting intelligence activities against Lithuania by regularly recruiting individuals who travel from Lithuania to Russia

At the two border control points currently operating on the border between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad Region, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) is actively seeking to identify potential intelligence targets among travellers. FSB officers are taking advantage of the fact that these individuals are travelling to Russia for business or personal reasons, such as visiting relatives or dealing with property matters. The FSB considers individuals who regularly visit the Kaliningrad Region and other parts of Russia to be suitable targets, since their ability to enter the country depends on their cooperation with the FSB.

Third-country nationals residing in Lithuania are also becoming targets of the FSB; for example, lorry drivers who are employed at international logistics companies and visit Russia for work. As with Lithuanian citizens, the FSB conducts detailed interviews to determine their political views and any potential threats they pose to Russia, as well as their potential to provide intelligence. The FSB pressures third-country nationals to cooperate by threatening to ban them from entering Russia.

We assess that due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, the FSB has prioritised the collection of military and Ukraine-related intelligence. It is exploiting individuals travelling from Lithuania to Russia for collection of information on a range of subjects. These include movement of Lithuanian and NATO Allies’ forces, military equipment and personnel in Lithuania, foreign troops, military exercises, the Ukrainian diaspora in Lithuania, and Lithuanian attitudes towards the war in Ukraine and support for the country. The FSB also recruits individuals who do not have access to classified information, but who can provide publicly unavailable information that the FSB is interested in.

The sanctions and restrictions imposed on Russia limit the capacity of its intelligence services to conduct human intelligence operations against Lithuania. Therefore, the FSB almost certainly will exploit every available opportunity to collect the necessary intelligence, and individuals from Lithuania who regularly visit Russia will remain a priority target for the FSB in this regard.

The FSB attempted to recruit a Lithuanian citizen who regularly travelled to Russia
After retiring from public service, Oleg*, a Lithuanian national, started a small car parts business and began to regularly visit the Kaliningrad Region for business. During the document check on his first visit to Russia, an FSB border guard discovered that Oleg often travelled to other European countries and intended to visit the region regularly. Due to his ability to provide information about his former workplace and colleagues, as well as the deployment and movement of NATO Allies’ forces in Lithuania and other countries, the FSB took an interest in Oleg and decided to establish a contact with him.

The next time he was crossing the border, an FSB border guard asked Oleg to leave his car in the car park and escorted him to a separate room for an interview, where another two people in plain clothes were present. The FSB officers interacted politely with Oleg in order to assess his potential for collecting intelligence. They asked him about his previous place of employment, his colleagues and how often he visited Russia. The FSB also wanted to know about Oleg’s political views and his attitude towards Russia and Lithuania’s policy. During the interrogation, the FSB examined his mobile devices and collected information that could be used to characterise and/or compromise him. This included the content from his social media accounts that reflected his political views, photos, contacts in Lithuanian law enforcement and other state institutions that were of interest to the FSB. The FSB officers who conducted the interrogation decided to develop further contacts with Oleg. Knowing about his upcoming trips to the Kaliningrad Region, they decided to recruit him.

A few months later, while travelling to the Kaliningrad Region, Oleg was interviewed by FSB officers again. During the interview they asked him questions about issues of interest to the FSB, such as his contacts in Ukraine, his acquaintances among the Ukrainian community in Lithuania, his views on the ‘special military operation’, and any military equipment and its movement that he had observed during his stay in Lithuania. The FSB officers expressed a particular interest in information regarding other former Lithuanian officers who visited Russia. At the end of the interrogation, Oleg was offered the opportunity to ‘assist Russia’, with the implication that if he refused to cooperate, the FSB would prohibit Oleg from entering Russia, which would have a negative impact on his business. Oleg, having heard of similar incidents involving the FSB, reached out to the VSD, reported the interrogation and received guidance on how to handle potential recruitment attempts by Russian intelligence services.
*The name and other identifying details of the Lithuanian citizen have been changed
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The GRU is changing the methods of conducting kinetic operations and expanding the range of targets Intensified Russia’s UAV attacks against Ukraine have led to an increase in violations of Lithuanian airspace
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